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A general study of arbitrary finite-size coherent attacks against continuous-variable quantum
cryptographic schemes is presented. It is shown that, if the size of the blocks that can be coherently
attacked by an eavesdropper is fixed and much smaller than the key size, then the optimal attack for
a given signal-to-noise ratio in the transmission line is an individual gaussian attack. Consequently,
non-gaussian coherent attacks do not need to be considered in the security analysis of such quantum
cryptosystems.
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Continuous-variable quantum information theory has
attracted a rapidly increasing interest over the past few
years (see, e.g., [1]). In this context, several quantum
key distribution (QKD) schemes based on the exchange
of continuous key carriers have been proposed (see, e.g.,
[2]). In particular, several schemes based on the contin-
uous modulation of coherent or squeezed states of light
supplemented with homodyne detection have been shown
to be particularly efficient for distributing secret keys at
high repetition rates [3, 4]. An experimental demonstra-
tion of key distribution based on a gaussian modulation
of coherent states was recently provided in [5].
In this Letter, we prove that given the estimated co-
variance matrix of Alice’s and Bob’s data, the optimal
finite-size coherent attack reduces to an individual gaus-
sian attack characterized by this covariance matrix. This
result fundamentally originates from the property that
the distribution maximizing its Shannon entropy for a
given variance is a gaussian distribution. This, com-
bined with an entropic uncertainty relation, implies that
is is sufficient to check the security of such cryptosystems
against the restricted class of gaussian attacks. In other
words, the best strategy for Eve is to apply sequentially,
on each key element, a gaussian cloning machine [6] or
an entangling gaussian cloning machine [7] depending on
the exact protocol used. Another consequence is that, in
order to maximize the resulting secret key rate via the
gaussian channel induced by Eve’s attack, Alice should
modulate her data with a gaussian distribution.
The security proof presented here is valid for all
continuous-variable QKD schemes where Alice and Bob
monitor the transmission line via the second-order mo-
ments of their data, which includes all the protocols con-
sidered in our previous papers [3, 4, 5]. Note, however,
that this excludes the alternative protocol based on post-
selection as presented in [8]. Our proof covers all possible
(including coherent) attacks that an eavesdropper may
apply on finite-size blocks of key elements. The block
size may be arbitrary, but it must be much smaller than
the key size, so that the key is made out of a large number
of independent blocks and statistical arguments therefore
warrant the use of information theory in the proof. The
unconditional security of squeezed-state QKD against co-
herent attacks is currently proven if the squeezing exceeds
some threshold [11], while such a proof for coherent-state
QKD is the topic of a separate study [12].
Squeezed state protocols. Let us first investigate the
security of gaussian-modulated squeezed-state protocols
[3]. Alice chooses a quadrature (q or p) at random and
sends Bob a displaced squeezed state, where the squeez-
ing and displacement are applied on the chosen quadra-
ture while the value of the displacement is gaussian dis-
tributed. After transmission via the quantum channel,
which may be controlled by Eve, Bob then measures q
or p at random. After disclosing the quadrature they
used, Alice and Bob discard their data when the quadra-
tures differ, while the rest is used to make a secret key
[9, 10]. We will in fact consider equivalent entanglement-
based protocols [4], where Alice prepares a two-mode vac-
uum squeezed state, measures a quadrature of one of the
beams and sends the other beam to Bob. Alice and Bob
iterate these actions n times, while we assume that Eve is
able to apply some arbitrary joint operation on this block
of n pulses. In order to acquire accurate statistics, Alice
and Bob repeat this protocol L times (with L≫ 1), that
is, they exchange L blocks of n pulses in total. In our
security analysis below, we will apply information theory
at the level of blocks, which is justified since L≫ 1.
We model Eve’s attack by considering that Alice, Bob,
and Eve share a pure tripartite entangled state (see
Fig. 1). Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) part of the state is a set of
n modes, denoted by A (resp. B). The unknown physi-
cal system kept by Eve is denoted by E. The joint state
is pure since we must assume that Eve is able to control
the environment, thereby to purify the state. We also
suppose that Bob always measures the same quadrature
Q as Alice (Q = q or p). This requires the availability of
a quantum memory (Bob delays his measurement until
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FIG. 1: Equivalent entanglement-based QKD proto-
col. The twin beams of an EPR-source (*) are sent to ho-
modyne detectors at Alice’s (left) and Bob’s (right) side. In
the analogue of the squeezed-state protocol, the beam-splitter
and the dashed lines are omitted, so Alice only measures one
quadrature (QA′ = QA). In the analogue of the coherent-
state protocol, the beam-splitter is used by Alice to measure
QA′ and PA′ simultaneously [13].
Alice discloses the quadrature she used). In a more real-
istic scheme where Alice and Bob independently choose
their quadrature q or p at random, they agree only half
of the time, which simply leads to a factor 1/2 in the
information rates computed below.
Information Rates. The mutual information between
Alice’s and Bob’s data is
I(B;A) = I(QB;QA) = H(QB)−H(QB|QA), (1)
where QA (resp. QB) is the random vector of Alice’s
(resp. Bob’s) measured quadratures on a block of n
pulses, while H(·) [resp. H(·|·)] denotes the Shannon en-
tropy (resp. conditional entropy) for continuous random
variables. We focus our attention on reverse reconcili-
ation protocols [5, 7], in which Bob’s data are used to
make the key instead of Alice’s data (direct reconcilia-
tion). Then, Eve tries to get the maximum information
on Bob’s measurement outcomes QB through a measure-
ment of her ancilla E (we denote Eve’s ancilla and her
measurement outcomes by the same symbol E). Eve’s
information is
I(B;E) = I(QB;E) = H(QB)−H(QB|E). (2)
The secret key rate Alice and Bob are guaranteed to be
able to distill by reverse reconciliation is [14, 15]
∆I = I(B;A)− I(B;E)
= H(QB|E)−H(QB|QA). (3)
Alice and Bob can, in principle, estimate H(QB|QA)
with arbitrary precision since they have access to L joint
realizations of the random vectorsQA and QB. To lower
bound Eve’s uncertainty on the key H(QB|E), they can
use the entropic uncertainty relation that applies to the
two sets of conjugate quadratures QB and PB [16, 17].
Indeed, we know that by measuring their systems, Alice
and Eve project Eve’s system onto a pure state since the
three of them share a joint pure state. Thus, condition-
ally on Alice’s and Eve’s measurements PA and E, the
pure state held by Bob must satisfy the entropic inequal-
ity
H(QB|E) +H(PB|PA) ≥ 2nH0, (4)
where H0 is the entropy of a quadrature of the vacuum
state for an harmonic oscillator. This inequality then
allows us to lower bound the accessible secret key rate
regardless the action of Eve, namely
∆I ≥ ∆Imin = 2nH0 −H(QB|QA)−H(PB|PA). (5)
It is worth stressing that the random vectors PA
and PB denote the quadratures that could have been
measured (the measured quadratures are QA and QB).
These quadratures are, of course, not directly accessi-
ble, but we only need their statistical distribution here
in order to upper bound Eve’s information. This distri-
bution can be estimated from the other pulses for which
the measured quadrature is the same as PA and PB. For
simplicity, we assume that the two physical quadratures q
and p are both chosen with probability 1/2. This implies
that QA and PA play fully identical roles so they can
be treated completely symmetrically (the same is true
for QB and PB). We insist on that this symmetry is
not a limitation on Eve’s possible actions. Even if Eve
has a quantum memory and acts differently on the phys-
ical quadratures q and p (after the selected quadrature
is disclosed), each of them has an equal probability to
be a measured (QA and QB) or an unmeasured (PA
and PB) quadrature. Since Eve has no way of guessing
which physical quadrature is used, this symmetry im-
poses H(QB|QA) = H(PB|PA) = H(B|A), where we
now use A and B as a shorthand notation for QA and
QB (or PA and PB). Therefore
∆Imin = 2(nH0 −H(B|A)). (6)
Since Alice and Bob can evaluate H(B|A) by statistical
sampling, they get an estimate of ∆Imin and can use
relevant algorithms to extract a secret key with at least
this rate [9, 10].
Individual attacks are optimal. We first prove that Al-
ice and Bob can lower bound ∆Imin simply by assuming
that Eve performs an individual attack. Let Ai (resp.
Bi) be the ith component of the random vector A (resp.
B). The subadditivity of Shannon entropy implies that
H(B|A) ≤
∑
i
H(Bi|A), (7)
while each term of the summation can be bounded by
use of the strong subadditivity of the entropy, namely
H(Bi|A) = H(Bi|A1, . . . , An) ≤ H(Bi|Ai), (8)
so that
H(B|A) ≤
∑
i
H(Bi|Ai). (9)
We now consider the average joint distribution of Al-
ice’s and Bob’s measurement outcomes (averaged over
3the block of size n). Suppose that A and B are dis-
tributed according to a mixture of the Ai’s and Bi’s,
with the index i being randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution, that is
P(A = a,B = b) = 1
n
∑
i
P(Ai = a,Bi = b), ∀a, b.
(10)
Then, the strong subadditivity of entropies implies that
H(Bi|Ai) = H(B|A, i) ≤ H(B|A), (11)
so that Eq. (9) transforms into
H(B|A) ≤ nH(B|A). (12)
Finally, using Eq. (6), one gets
∆Imin ≥ 2n(H0 −H(B|A)). (13)
This means that, to be safe against finite-size coherent
attacks, Alice and Bob only need to evaluate H(B|A), a
conditional entropy for a distribution in R2, instead of
H(B|A), a conditional entropy for a distribution in R2n.
To better understand this conclusion, assume that Eve
applies a coherent attack which induces correlations be-
tween the various components of A and B inside each
block. These correlations force Eve to induce a kind of
structure in Alice’s and Bob’s data, which would not be
present for individual attacks, so Eve is actually limiting
herself. Overlooking these correlations and considering
individual attacks only may be suboptimal for Alice and
Bob when estimating ∆Imin, but it guarantees they are
on the safe side.
Gaussian attacks are optimal. Now, we prove that
H(B|A) can be upper bounded simply by measuring the
covariance matrix K of variables A and B,
K =
[ 〈A2〉 〈AB〉
〈AB〉 〈B2〉
]
, (14)
which is much easier than estimating H(B|A). To sim-
plify the notations, we will assume that 〈A〉 = 〈B〉 = 0
(in practice, this should be checked and possibly cor-
rected by applying the adequate shift). For a given K, if
Alice knows A, her linear estimate of B that minimizes
the error variance is given by 〈AB〉〈A2〉 A. Denoting by δB
the error of this best linear estimate,
δB = B − 〈AB〉〈A2〉 A (15)
we have
H(B|A) = H(δB|A) ≤ H(δB). (16)
where we have used the translation invariance and the
subadditivity of Shannon entropy. Since the gaussian dis-
tribution has the maximum entropy for a given variance,
one has
H(δB) ≤ HG(δB), (17)
where HG(δB) is the entropy of a gaussian distribution
having the variance 〈δB2〉 = 〈B2〉 − 〈AB〉2/〈A2〉. In
the case where A and B are drawn from an equivalent
bivariate Gaussian distribution with the same covariance
matrix K as the observed distribution, we note that δB
and A become uncorrelated, so that
HG(δB) = HG(δB|A) (18)
Chaining Eqs. (16) to (18) and using the translation in-
variance of entropy, one obtains
H(B|A) ≤ HG(B|A), (19)
which, combined with Eq. (13), yields
∆Imin ≥ 2n(H0 −HG(B|A)). (20)
Finally, the conditional entropy HG(B|A) of a bivariate
gaussian distribution being a simple function of K, one
obtain the central result of this paper,
∆Imin ≥ n log N0〈δB2〉 , (21)
where N0 represents the vacuum variance. This expres-
sion coincides with the one found when limiting Eve to
gaussian individual attacks [4, 5]. Therefore, the opti-
mal attack given the observed covariance matrix K is a
gaussian individual attack as described in [5, 7, 13].
The optimality of gaussian attacks can be interpreted
almost alike the optimality of individual attacks : since
the gaussian distribution has the maximal entropy, non-
gaussian attacks are more structured than gaussian ones
for a same added noise variance, so Eve is more restricted.
Therefore, if Alice and Bob only monitor the covariance
matrix K, they can safely assume that Eve uses gaussian
attacks. If Eve indeed applies a gaussian attack, the best
Alice and Bob can do is to use independent and gaussian-
distributed key elements, which saturates all the involved
inequalities, so that ∆Imin is the highest. This justifies
a posteriori the choice of gaussian-modulated QKD pro-
tocols in [3, 4, 5].
Coherent state protocols. We now extend the proof
to QKD protocols based on gaussian-modulated coherent
states [4, 5, 7]. We again exploit the property that these
protocols are equivalent to some entanglement-based pro-
tocols where Alice jointly measures q and p on her entan-
gled beam while sending the other one to Bob [13]. The
central point is that this “virtual entanglement,” which
may have existed between Alice and Bob, must be taken
into account when bounding Eve’s information even if the
actual protocol makes no use of entanglement. We will
denote by QA′ and PA′ the vectors of the two quadra-
tures of the n beams kept by Alice and QB the vector of
the n quadratures measured by Bob (see Fig. 1). The dif-
ference with the previous scheme is that Alice attempts
to measure simultaneously QA′ and PA′ through a 50:50
4beam-splitter followed by two homodyne detectors. The
measurement outcomes QA and PA suffer from added
noise, while Alice never has access to the actual values
QA′ and PA′ . The expression of H(QB|QA) only de-
pends on measured quantities so it can be statistically
estimated as before, but the entropic uncertainty rela-
tion used to bound H(QB|E) now involves the physical
beam on Alice’s side, so one has
H(QB|E) +H(PB|PA′) ≥ 2nH0 (22)
Thus, the same reasoning as before now leads to
∆Imin ≥ n(2H0 −HG(B|A) −HG(B|A′)), (23)
where HG(B|A′) is the conditional entropy of a gaussian
distribution having the same covariance matrix K′ than
A′ and B, which is
K′ =
[
〈A′2〉 〈A′B〉
〈A′B〉 〈B2〉
]
=
[
2(〈A2〉 −N0)
√
2〈AB〉√
2〈AB〉 〈B2〉
]
(24)
One has therefore
∆Imin ≥ n log N0√(〈B2〉 − 〈AB〉2〈A2〉 )(〈B2〉 − 〈AB〉2〈A′2〉−N0
) ,
(25)
which is exactly the same expression as in our previous
papers [5, 7, 13], where the only considered attacks are
gaussian individual attacks.
Discussion. We extended to finite-size non-gaussian
attacks the validity of the previous security proofs for
continuous-variable QKD schemes when Eve’s interven-
tion is bounded via the measured added noise variance in
the channel. Our proof focuses on the schemes based on
reverse reconciliation since these are known to tolerate
larger losses than the direct reconciliation-based proto-
cols in the case of gaussian individual attacks. Adapting
the proof to direct-reconciliation [3, 4] or even other [8]
protocols will treated elsewhere. In the proof, we assume
the protocol is ideal, that is, a perfect one-way reconcil-
iation algorithm is available. However, realistic reconcil-
iation protocols are imperfect [10]: the number of corre-
lated bits that can be extracted from Alice’s and Bob’s
data never attains Shannon’s limit I(B;A) and may be-
come low if Eve’s attack has an unexpected shape, the
reconciliation protocol being adapted to a specific noise
structure. Nevertheless, the security proof can be eas-
ily extended to this situation since Alice and Bob can
always compute the effective value of their shared infor-
mation Ieff by comparing subsets of their data. Then,
using I(B;E) ≤ n(H0 − HG(B|A′)) as before, one ob-
tains ∆Imin ≥ Ieff − I(B;E).
Finally, we have shown that there is a fundamental
link between security and “entropic squeezing”: the secu-
rity is guaranteed (∆Imin > 0) if the conditional entropy
H(B|A) is below the quantum limit H0 [Eq. (13)]. In the
gaussian case, this simplifies to condition σ2(B|A) < N0
[Eq. (21)], where σ2(B|A) = 〈δB2〉 denotes the condi-
tional variance of B knowing A, as suggested in [18].
The latter condition is, however, over-pessimistic if Eve
uses a non-gaussian attack, since σ2(B|A) might exceed
N0, destroying the conditional squeezing, while keeping
H(B|A) low enough to ensure security. If Alice and Bob
only monitor the covariance matrix K, this attack is
non-optimal since the worst-case gaussian attack would
maximize H(B|A) and thereby minimize ∆I for a given
σ2(B|A). In conclusion, the security can be warranted by
requiring conditional squeezing, which is more stringent
than entropic squeezing but much easier to assess.
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